This paper deals with a time dependent game model under the duel type setup. The new hybrid model of the game theory and the fluctuation process in the process could be applied for various practical decision making situations. The unique theoretical stochastic game model is proposed to analyze the two person duel type game with the random discrete time series. The actions of the players are formalized by marked point processes to identify the chances for the successful shootings at the certain points of the time. The processes evolve until one of the processes crosses its fixed threshold of the probability of the success. Once the threshold is reached at some point of time, the associated player has the highest chance to succeed his shoot. The parameters for the strategic decision including the moments of crossings, prior crossings and the optimal number of iterations to get the highest chance for successful shooting are obtained by the compact closed joint functional. In addition, the paper also introduces the decision making implementation which briefly explains how to use the solutions into a typical business case and how it actually works.
INTRODUCTION
A game theory has been applied for various strategic situations and developed to solve real-world issues more innovatively. A typical duel is an arranged engagement in combat between two persons, with matched weapons in accordance with agreed upon the rules under different conditions. The duel game in the paper is such that players are shooting a target rather than shooting each other. So, each player could choose either to "shoot" or "wait" for one step closer to the target on his turn (or iteration). In general, a basic duel game model accurately describes the conditions and finds when and who could win the battle even at the beginning. The backward induction provides a simple solution: regardless of whether you have a better or a worse shoot, the shooting moment when the sum of the success probabilities passes the threshold is the most critical (Polak, 2008 ). This basic model could be applied to various business decision making situations even though the rules and conditions of a basic duel game model are relatively restricted. Various duel type games have been studied since 1970s Kimeldorf, 1975, 1976; Radzik, 1988; 1989) and one of lessons from them is the decision that matter is when to do rather than what to do (Polak, 2008) . Unfortunately, duel type games only consider the deterministic turn around (iteration) for shooting.
The article presents a stochastic duel type game with the complete information which means both players know the success probability not only for himself (player A) but also for opponent (player B). But, unlike classical (or deterministic) duel games, each player might not have the same iteration periods and the iteration periods for each round might be different even within the same player (i.e., stochastic). Lastly, the paper demonstrates the special case of the stochastic duel game which is based on the deterministic iteration time for each player. It is a relatively simple case but it gives more clear understanding how this new type of stochastic duel games works.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a model of a process where the decision making occurs according to a marked point process in time, with two dimensional marks presenting the cumulative success probabilities up to the dominant point of shooting. We derive a joint functional of each component as the process at the first passing the dominant point and at one step prior. This section also contains practical implications how to understand this new model properly. In Section 3, the special case of a versatile stochastic duel game is covered. It deals with the deterministic iteration times of both players and demonstrates how the stochastic duel game could be applied into atypical well known duel game. This section also contains the way of the time domain transform from the distance domain.
A S D G NTAGONISTIC TOCHASTIC UEL AME
The antagonistic duel game of two players (called "A" and "B") are introduced and both players know the completed information regarding the success probabilities based on the time. Each player has two strategies either "shoot" or "wait" and choose one strategy at the certain points of time. Let be player A's payoff (related) function based on the E = a b continues time and be player B's payoff (related) function based on the continues = F > a b time . Both functions are assigned as follows:
The ac success probability functions of both players could be as follows: cumulative
The strategic decision for a duel game is to find the moment when a player will have the best chance to hit the other. Both accumulative success probabilities could be any arbitrary incremental continuous function which reaches 1 when the time (or ) goes to the = > allowed maximum and, typically, it goes to the infinity. In the duel game, there is a a b = max certain point that maximizes the chance for succeeding the shoot (i.e., success probability). This optimal point becomes the moment of the success in the continuous time domain and this moment is defined as follows:
It is noted that each player can make the decision at the certain points of the time and that is the reason why it becomes a discrete time series even though the success probabilities are continuous functions. Let ( , ( ), ) be a probability time space and let
are -measurable and -measurable renewal point processes with the following Y Y W X notation:
The game in this case is a stochastic process describing the evolution of a conflict between players A and player B based on the fully known information (i.e., the success probabilities of players). Only on the -th epoch , player A could make the decision j W 4 either for taking a shoot or for waiting until another turn (iteration) . He will have the W 4" best chance to hit the player B exceeds its respective threshold (or To U V . for player B) further formalize the game, the exit indices are introduced as follows:
a b 2.9 and
and indicates that player A is starting first in this game. In the case of the duel type 5 ! <! games, the threshold of each player could be converged into one value which will be > ‡ introduced later. Player A will have the best chance to succeed for shooting compare to the failure chance of player B ( and respectively). Hence, player A has the
highest success probability of shooting at time , unless player B does not reach his best W . shooting chance at time . Thus, the game is ended at . However, we are
/ (i. e., the game with player A obtains the best chance for shooting first). The first passage time W . is the associated time from the confined game. The functional
of the game will represent the status of both players upon and exit time pre-exit time W . W ." (Dshalalow, 1995) . The latter is of particular interest, because player A wants to predict not only his time of the highest chance, but also the moment of the next highest chance prior to this. The Theorem 1 establishes an explicit formula for and we Q ./ abbreviate with (2.12)-(2.19):
We will use the Laplace-Carson transform with the inverse
where is the inverse of the bivariate Laplace transform (Dshalalow and Ke, 2009) . _ " Theorem 1. The functional of the game on trace
/ satisfies the following formula:
Proof: Introduce the families:
Application for to will bypass all terms except for _ Q s :;
. Thus, applying operator to random set 
where
can be revived when the inverse of the operator of (2.21) to ) and the optimal number of iterations = W ß X à . / " " pre-exit time for both players. The information for both players from the closed functional are as follows:
It is noted that the best shooting moments of both players may be revised because the optimal index of each player should be an integer. The versatile stochastic duel game allows to analyze the game of two conflicted factors in the continues time domain. Although the original duel game is limited to the success probabilities of two players based on the distance between players, the continuous time domain duel game in this research could be flexible by using any incremental functions based on the continuous time domain.
The backward induction which is the core of a duel game does not be changed in the stochastic game. The best strategy for each player is "shoot as soon as that the player cross the point when sum of the success probability of hitting equals one (Polak, 2008) ." The functional Q ./ gives the full information to build up the winning strategies. From (2.32)-(2.36), player A should take a shoot at his -th turn (which means he should wait until the . .  " iterations). The average duration until player A has the best chance to win becomes
. Similarly, player B should shoot at his -th iteration and the average duration is "c d X / . Basically, each player will continue their iterations until the accumulated iteration passes the threshold which is from (2.4). the strategies of player A are little bit complicated because it means that player B will have his best shoot before player A. To build up the proper strategy for the player A, the chances at should be compared with W ." the chances at Practically, we may consider
to analyze the best time for shooting.
it is noted that player B In the case of ,
shoots at the best moment does not guaranteed for actual success. In other words, "c d X / player B could still fail the shoot even at the best time "c d X / . If player A has the highest chances at compare to (i.e., player A will take the "c d
after player B fails his shoot at . Otherwise, player A should take the shoot at the time the time higher than
" instead of when the chances at W ." the chances at (i.e., )
. Again, it does not matter players are better or worse shooting but it is the cumulative success probabilities that matter.
S C D I T PECIAL ASE: ETERMINISTIC TERATION IMES
This section demonstrates the practical case of the versatile stochastic duel game which considers the deterministic iteration time for each player. As it is mentioned before, the continuous time domain duel game in this research could be flexible by using any incremental functions based on the continuous time domain. Let us assume that the optimal moment of a time domain duel game is already known as from (2.1)-(2. ).
Since, we are dealing with the deterministic iteration process for each player, the durations of one iteration for each player are constant values. From (2. )-(2. ) and (2. ): Lemma 1. The functional based on the fixed iteration duration (3.1) is as follows:
Proof: from (2.12), let us assign (2.13)-(2.19) as follows:
Recall the from (2.22), we have Theorem 1
e fe f a b where e f P oe oe  s s s " ? ? ?
From (3.13)-(3.16), ). It means . oe "( , that player A should take the shoot at 8th iteration which gives the highest chance to succeed the shoot. From (3.18), the of player A gives the best hitting chance and exit time the hitting probability of him is from (2.1) and (2.3).
Reconstructing the Classical Duel Game
The classical duel game based on the distance is a special case of the versatile stochastic duel game under the deterministic iteration time condition. This section demonstrates how the duel game in the time domain could be adapted to analyze a classic duel game in the distance domain. As it has been mentioned in the previous section, the classical duel game is adapted from Polak (2008) . Let us consider the duel game which has the following rules:
1. Each player (player A, B) has a gun with single bullet and player A start the gameà 2 and they are facing each other with the distance of between them; Þ P oe $! Ò7Ó a b 3. let be the probability of player A hitting player B if player A shoots at distance ; T 6 6 + a b 4. let is the player B's probability of hitting player A if player B shoots at distance ; T 6 6 , a b 5. the probability of hitting for each player is give as follows:
T 6 oe P  6 ß T 6 oe "  † 6ß ! Ÿ 6 Ÿ Pß "
6. players alternatively have the chance to make the decision; 7. either "shoot" or "one step forward"; a b 6 oe # Ò7Ó ! 8. Every turn makes every closer each other if both players are moving #6 oe % Ò7Ó ! a b forward instead of shooting; 9. the hitting probabilities of both players are known (i.e., perfect information).
According to the above rules, the illustration of the hitting probabilities of both players is shown in Fig. 2 .
Fig. 2. Probability of hitting for both players
The first shot should occur at which means that no one should before by dominance 6 6 Fig. 3 . Probability of hitting in the distance and the time domain
As it is illustrated in Fig. 3 , the hitting probabilities in both domains are same but the input variable has been changed to time (seconds) from distance (meters). Once the distance domain is mapping in the time domain, we could find the best response from . / a b a b . + (3.21) which could be graphically demonstrated in Fig. 4 . The best responses function of player A shows all iteration time range of player B and the best response in the classic duel game based on the above setup is 5-th iteration where . oe . , + (i.e., the downward-pointing triangle) in Fig. 4. 
CONCLUSION
The antagonistic stochastic duel game has been studied. In this versatile duel game, both players could have random iterations. A joint functional of process has been constructed to analyze the information of decision making parameters which gives the best chance to win the game. Compact closed forms for Laplace-Carson transforms of named functional have been obtained. The hybrid model of the game theory and the fluctuation process is newly proposed and it is more flexible to apply practical problems effectively. The analytical approach supports to understand the core of the stochastic duel game efficiently. Furthermore, the brief guideline for the direct implementation for decision making situations has been explained for the future uses.
